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The ComFoRT Reasoning Framework

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
Predictable Assembly from Certifiable Components

Enable the development of software systems from software components where:

- critical runtime attributes e.g., performance and safety, are reliably predicted (**predictable assembly**)
- properties of software components needed for prediction are trusted (**certifiable components**)




PACC Component Technology Idiom




The Construction and Composition Language (CCL) formalizes this idiom

PACC Reasoning Frameworks



- development of analysis techniques
- transitioning of analysis to practitioners





ComFoRT Reasoning Framework

- Contains a software model checker **Copper**:
 - provides **new model checking techniques** developed for verification of component software
 - builds on academic tool **MAGIC**
- Analysis models are **automatically** extracted from programs
- **Claims** and verification **results** (counterexamples) are mapped to programs



Verification Domain

High-level designs (CCL programs) and C programs

- Sequential and concurrent

Communication via **shared actions**

- **Synchronous** communication
- **Asynchronous** execution



Copper Capabilities

State/Event-based Verification

- leverages distinction between *data* and *communication actions*

Compositional Deadlock Detection


- automated deadlock detection that ensures *sound abstractions* and acts as a space reduction procedure

Verification of Evolving Systems

- automated component *substitutability checks*




ComFoRT Underlying Framework





ComFoRT Underlying Framework






State/Event-based Model Checking (IFM04)

Labeled Kripke Structures

- Every state is labeled with a set of atomic propositions, P , true in the state
- Every LKS comes with an alphabet of actions, Σ



State/Event LTL and State/Event AW formalisms


Efficient model checking algorithms for SE-LTL and SE-AW employing the compositional abstraction-refinement framework



State/Event-based Model Checking

Labeled Kripke Structures


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State/Event LTL and State/Event AW formalisms

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
Surge Protector : State/Event



Changes of current beyond threshold are disallowed

G (($c2 \rightarrow m=2$) & ($c1 \rightarrow (m=1 \vee m=2)$))

Surge Protector : State Only




G $((c=0 \vee c=2) \ \& \ \mathbf{X} \ (c=1)) \rightarrow (m=1 \vee m=2)$ &

G $((c=0 \vee c=1) \ \& \ \mathbf{X} \ (c=2)) \rightarrow m=2$

Deadlock Detection (MEMOCODE'04)

Deadlocks are not preserved by **abstraction**

- Abstraction refinement does not work



Copper: $Deadlock = AbsRef(s) = \Sigma$

to **preserve** deadlock the *abstract model* **over-approximates** not just what *concrete program* can do but also what it **refuses**



Compositional Deadlock Detection

Deadlock is inherently **non-compositional**

- Can't say anything by looking at components individually


Copper: $\text{AbsRef}(A_1, A_2) = \text{AbsRef}(A_1) \cup \text{AbsRef}(A_2)$

Abstract deadlock - reachable state s such that $\text{AbsRef}(s) = \Sigma$

Copper: No **abstract deadlock** in abstract models No
deadlock in concrete models

Automated, compositional and iterative deadlock detection, In Proceedings of the *Conference on Formal Methods for Codesign (MEMOCODE) 2004*, by Sagar Chaki, Edmund Clarke, Joel Ouaknine and Natasha Sharygina


Component Substitutability Check



Containment check (Local correctness)

Are **all local** old services (properties) of the verified component contained in the upgraded component?

Component Substitutability Check



Compatibility Check (Global safety check)

Are new services of the upgraded component safe with respect to other components in assembly: **all global** specifications still hold?



Substitutability Check Approach

- Procedure for checking *simultaneous upgrades* of *multiple components* (FM'04)
 - **Abstraction (under- and over- approximations)** for the component containment check
 - **Compositional reasoning + learning regular sets** for automated compatibility check
- Procedure for checking *individual component upgrades* (SAVCBS'04)
 - Algorithms based on **learning regular sets technique** for the component containment and compatibility tests



Substitutability Check Approach

- Procedure for checking *simultaneous upgrades* of *multiple components*
 - **Abstraction (under- and over- approximations)** for the component containment check
 - **Compositional reasoning + learning regular sets** for automated compatibility check

Dynamic Component Substitutability Analysis, In Proceedings of FM 2005 *Formal Methods Conference*, by Sagar Chaki, Ed Clarke, Natasha Sharygina and Nishant Sinha.

Verification of Evolving Software, In Proceedings of SAVCBS 2004 by Sagar Chaki, Natasha Sharygina and Nishant Sinha

PECT - critical_section.ccl - SEI PECT IDE

File Edit Navigate Search Project Tools Window Help

Navigator

- Design
 - ComFoRT
 - ComposedIPC
 - Claim1-annotated.txt
 - composed.spec
 - critical_section.ccl
 - critical_section.pp
 - critical_section.spec
 - environment.pp
 - environment.spec
 - ipc_queue.c.pp
 - ipc_queue.ccl
 - ipc_queue.spec
 - ipc_queue.xml
 - read_msg_queue.ccl
 - read_msg_queue.pp
 - read_msg_queue.spec
 - write_msg_queue.ccl
 - write_msg_queue.pp
 - write_msg_queue.spec
 - CriticalSection
 - SSL
 - GeneratedCode
 - .project
 - Interactive
 - ComFoRT
 - Design

```

int numWaiting = 0;
int waiting1 = 0;
int type1 = 0;
int waiting2 = 0;
int type2 = 0;
int random = 0;
int error = 0;
int caller = 0;

sink mutex EnterCriticalSection_read (consume int caller);
sink mutex LeaveCriticalSection_read (consume int caller);
sink mutex EnterCriticalSection_write (consume int caller);
sink mutex LeaveCriticalSection_write (consume int caller);

threaded react CS (EnterCriticalSection_read, LeaveCriticalSection_read, EnterCr
start -> one ()
one -> two (trigger ^EnterCriticalSection_read(caller);)
two -> one ()
one -> three (trigger ^LeaveCriticalSection_read(caller);)
three -> one ()
one -> four (trigger ^EnterCriticalSection_write(caller);)
four -> one ()
one -> five (trigger ^LeaveCriticalSection_write(caller);)
five -> one ()

state two { entry /

```

Problems Properties Console

ComFoRT

Verification complete.

Claim Claim28 does not hold. See targets_C1_Claim28.txt for the counterexample.

Demo/Design/ComposedIPC/critical_section.ccl

start PECT - critical_section... Microsoft PowerPoint ... 4:43 AM

PECT - critical_section.ccl - SEI PECT IDE

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 - Claim1-annotated.txt
 - composed.spec
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 - critical_
 - critical_
 - environ
 - environ
 - ipc_que
 - ipc_que
 - ipc_que
 - ipc_que
 - read_m
 - read_m
 - read_m
 - read_m
 - write_m
 - write_m
 - write_m
 - write_m
 - CriticalSecti
 - SSL
 - GeneratedCode
 - .project
 - Interactive
 - ComFoRT
 - Design

critical_section.ccl

```
int numWaiting = 0;
int waiting1 = 0;
int type1 = 0;
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sink mutex EnterCriticalSection_read (consume int caller);
sink mutex LeaveCriticalSection_read (consume int caller);
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start -> one ()
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four -> one ()
one -> five (trigger ^LeaveCriticalSection_write(caller);)
five -> one ()
```

Problems Properties Console


ComFoRT

Verification complete.

Claim Claim28 does not hold. See targets_C1_Claim28.txt for the counterexample.

Demo/Design/ComposedIPC/critical_section.ccl

start PECT - critical_sectio... Microsoft PowerPoint ... 4:44 AM



PECT - Claim1-annotated.txt - SEI PECT IDE

File Edit Navigate Search Project Tools Window Help

Navigator

- Design
 - ComFoRT
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 - critical_section
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 - critical_section
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 - ipc_queue.ccl
 - ipc_queue.spe
 - ipc_queue.xml
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 - read_msg_que
 - read_msg_que
 - write_msg_que
 - write_msg_que
 - write_msg_que
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```

##### P6::STUTTER #####
P6::temp_var_110 = do_environment ( & P6::x , & P6::y , & P6::z ) : STUTTER
##### P6::STUTTER #####
P6::temp_var_110 = do_environment ( & P6::x , & P6::y , & P6::z ) : STUTTER
##### P6::STUTTER #####
P6::temp_var_110 = do_environment ( & P6::x , & P6::y , & P6::z )
***** end local CE dag #6 *****
CE dag projections analysed ...
<<< END CHECKPOINT >>>

<<< CHECKPOINT : Projection of CE on fourth component >>>
***** start local CE dag #3 *****
P3::curState = 145
##### (P3::curState = [ $0 == 145 ]) #####
P3::critical_section_owner = 0
##### (P3::critical_section_owner = [ $0 == 0 ]) #####
P3::critical_section_ownerType = 0
##### (P3::critical_section_ownerType = [ $0 == 0 ]) #####
P3::critical_section_timesEntered = 0
##### (P3::critical_section_timesEntered = [ $0 == 0 ]) #####
P3::critical_section_numWaiting = 0
##### (P3::critical_section_numWaiting = [ $0 == 0 ]) #####
P3::critical_section_waiting1 = 0
##### (P3::critical_section_waiting1 = [ $0 == 0 ]) #####
P3::critical_section_type1 = 0
##### (P3::critical_section_type1 = [ $0 == 0 ]) #####

```

Problems Properties Console

ComFoRT

Pre-processing complete.

Starting verification as background task...

Writable Insert 2945 : 19 Verifying Claim1

start PECT - Claim1-annota... Choose ComFoRT claims Choose ComFoRT claims Choose ComFoRT claims Microsoft PowerPoint ... 4:50 AM

PECT - Claim1-annotated.txt - SEI PECT IDE

File Edit Navigate Search Project Tools Window Help

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 - critical_section
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 - critical_section
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 - read_msg_que
 - write_msg_que
 - write_msg_que
 - write_msg_que
 - CriticalSection
 - SSL
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 - .project
 - Interactive

ipc_queue.ccl critical_section.ccl read_msg_queue.ccl write_msg_queue... composed.spec Claim1-annotate...

```
model extracted in 27638.8 milliseconds ...
model loaded from file ...
implementation states for control locations computed ...
model extracted in 443.5 milliseconds ...
model saved in 73.6 milliseconds ...
implementation states for control locations computed ...
model extracted in 27862.8 milliseconds ...

<<< CHECKPOINT : new predicates inferred from spurious counterexample >>>
Seeding with branch ( P3::critical_section_owner == 0 )
Seeding with branch ( P3::critical_section_owner == P3::critical_section_caller )
Seeding with branch ( P3::critical_section_owner == 0 )
Seeding with branch ( P3::critical_section_owner == P3::critical_section_caller )
<<< END CHECKPOINT >>>

spurious counter-example detected !!
abstraction refined !!
starting iteration number 3 ...
model saved in 75.7 milliseconds ...
number of abstract implementation states = 3975
implementation states for control locations computed ...
action-guided transitions computed ...
model extracted in 25843.6 milliseconds ...
implementation machine extracted in 25844.2 milliseconds ...
global states : ( 280 284 626 3975 7 7 2 ) = 19391612016000
```

Problems Properties Console

ComFoRT

```
Pre-processing complete.
Starting verification as background task...
```

Writable Insert 6344 : 31 Verifying Claim1

start PECT - Claim1-annota... Choose ComFoRT claims Choose ComFoRT claims Choose ComFoRT claims Microsoft PowerPoint ... 4:53 AM

PECT - Claim1-annotated.txt - SEI PECT IDE

File Edit Navigate Search Project Tools Window Help

Navigator

- Design
 - ComFoRT
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 - composed.spe
 - critical_section
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 - write_msg_que
 - CriticalSection
 - SSL
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 - .project
 - Interactive
 - ComFoRT
 - Design
 - GeneratedCode
 - .project

```
<<< CHECKPOINT : valid CE found >>>
CE dag projections analysed ...
conformance relation does not exist !!
abstraction abs1 is invalid ...
<<< END CHECKPOINT >>>

<<< CHECKPOINT : various statistics >>>
total global time = 1584534.2 milliseconds
total cpu time = 1414160.0 milliseconds
total input processing time = 542.7 milliseconds
total Buchi automaton construction time = 0.0 milliseconds
total implementation machine extraction time = 223985.4 milliseconds
total verification time = 1238970.9 milliseconds
total proof generation time = 0.0 milliseconds
total abstraction refinement time = 121032.3 milliseconds
total CE generation time = 12.6 milliseconds
total CE verification time = 2587.9 milliseconds
total predicate abstraction refinement time = 118444.3 milliseconds
total LTS abstraction refinement time = 0.0 milliseconds
total number of eliminating combinations = 0
max number of eliminating combinations for a CE = 0
max size of eliminating combination = 0
max size of tried combination = 0
number of iterations = 4
number of predicate iterations = 4
number of lts iterations = 0
number of seed branches : 5
specification details : 3 states 2 transitions
number of implementation states : 106422142422400
```

Problems Properties Console

ComFoRT

Writable Insert 12140 : 1 Verifying Claim1

start PECT - Claim1-annota... Choose ComFoRT claims Choose ComFoRT claims Choose ComFoRT claims Microsoft PowerPoint ... 4:56 AM

Applications

IPC Module

- Deployed by a world leader in robotics
- Discovered **synchronization bug** under which senders would receive the wrong answer to their requests
- Problem had remained undetected for seven years prior to independent discovery by business unit

Case Study: Micro-C OS

- Real-time OS for **embedded** applications
 - 6000+ LOC, widely used
- Verified **locking discipline**
- Found **four bugs**
 - Missing **unlock** and **return**
 - Three already reported





Ongoing and Future Work

- Use a SAT solver for computing abstraction
 - Semantics of bit-wise operators is taken into account
- Use of pattern languages for specifying properties
- Integrated Abstraction and Compositional reasoning
- Component certification



ComFoRT Resources

ComFoRT tools

- <http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pacc/comfort.html>

Ongoing industrial & academic collaborations

- Prof. Edmund Clarke and his model checking group, Prof. Peter Lee at CMU
- Prof. Dr. Daniel Kroening from ETH Zurich
- Industrial corporate research centers developing embedded controllers

Conference and Journal publications



References

Overview of ComFoRT: A Model Checking Reasoning Framework, CMU/SEI Tech. Report SEI-2004-TN-018 by James Ivers and Natasha Sharygina

State/Event-based Software Model Checking, In Proceedings of IFM *Integrated Formal Methods 2004 International Conference*, by Sagar Chaki, Edmund Clarke, Joel Ouaknine, Natasha Sharygina and Nishant Sinha.

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References

Verification of Evolving Software, In Proceedings of SAVCBS 2004 by Sagar Chaki, Natasha Sharygina and Nishant Sinha

Snapshot of CCL: A Language for Predictable Assembly, In *CMU/SEI TR-2002-TR-031*, by James Ivers and Kurt Wallnau

A Technology for Predictable Assembly from Certifiable Components (PACC), In *CMU/SEI-TR-2003-TR-009*, by Kurt Wallnau

SAT-based predicate abstraction for ANSI-C, In *Formal Methods System Design Journal*, Vol. 25(2), 2004, by Daniel Kroening, Ed Clarke, Natasha Sharygina and Karen Yorav.