The SEI helps advance software engineering principles and practices and serves as a national resource in software engineering, computer security, and process improvement. The SEI works closely with defense and government organizations, industry, and academia to continually improve software-intensive systems. Its core purpose is to help organizations improve their software engineering capabilities and develop or acquire the right software, defect free, within budget and on time, every time.
Numerous techniques have been proposed by which an end-system, subjected to a denial-of-service flood, filters the offending traffic. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of several such proposals, using traffic recorded at the border of a large network and including real DoS traffic. We focus our analysis on four filtering techniques, two based on the addresses from which the victim server typically receives traffic (static clustering and network-aware clustering), and two based on coarse indications of the path each packet traverses (hop-count filtering and path identifiers). Our analysis reveals challenges facing the proposed techniques in practice, and the implications of these issues for effective filtering. In addition, we compare techniques on equal footing, by evaluating the performance of one scheme under assumptions made by another. We conclude with an interpretation of the results and suggestions for further analysis.